NOTICE FILING FOR ASSIGNMENTS
OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
JOHN DEJ. PEMBERTON, JR.*

The controversy over the desirability of notice-filing legislation applicable to
assignments of accounts receivable is not merely a product of the decision in Corn
Exchange Bank v. Klauder.1 Not even the much-maligned Chandler Act amendment to Section 6oa 2 of the Bankruptcy Act is solely to blame. The controversy is
really a quite ordinary part of the age-long conflict between a commercial interest
(among potential borrowers and lenders) in achieving workable security devices
and a more general interest (among potential creditors and bona fide purchasers)

in avoiding secret transfers and secret liens. Section 6oa became, in 1938, a culmination of one phase of that conflict-a culmination which attempted to dictate that
the policy against secrecy would prevail with respect to that one phases-but it
left room for state legislation to provide workable security devices within its limitations. But previous amendments of that and other sections of the Act had similarly attempted to dictate a predominance in their respective spheres of the policy
against secret liens, usually with unhappy results when choices of interpretation were
left open to the courts. 4 When the Klauder case "decided" that Section 6oa now
meant what it said it meant,5 it merely threw a spotlight on the inadequacy of state
law to provide a workable security device in the field of assignments of accounts
receivable.
It is the aim of this article to review the main features of the current controversy
in the light of that larger conflict of which it is a part. In view of the plethora of
* Associate Professor of Law, Duke University.
1 318 U. S. 434 (943)-

252 STAT. 869 (938),

zi U.S.C. §96a (940).

' Section 6o's peculiar phase of that conflict is, of course, that relating to the effect of secrecy on the
success of an attempt to prefer. The draftsmen of the 1938 amendment were necessarily preoccupied
with two lines of earlier cases, dealing respectively with unrecorded security interests and the so-called
"equitable liens" and permitting secret transfers of that type to survive bankruptcy despite perfection
within the four-month preference period. But the draftsmen apparently rejected an alternative proposal
designed to remedy those specific failures of the earlier Section 6o in favor of the more sweeping "bona
fide purchaser" provision designed to test all the elements of a preference as of the date on which the
veil of secrecy was lifted to whatever extent state law might require to defeat subsequent bona fide
purchasers. See McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 6o -ARv.L. RPEv. 233, 245 (1946);
with which compare McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 H.Av. L. REV. 341, 379
(1927). And see the testimony of W. Randolph Montgomery before the New York Law Revision
Commission on September 21, 1945, reported in STATE op NEW YopK, LEoisLAnva DocumENT, No. 65(K)

299-300 (946).
Of course, even under the present Section 6o a secret transfer will survive bankruptcy
if, under state law, it will survive both subsequent creditor action and subsequent bona fide purchases.
'See McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 6o HARv. L. REv. 233, 236-245 (946).
'But see note 22 infra.
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comment in law and trade journals already devoted to the dispute,' it would be
impossible to claim that this paper will add much that is new. Even the attempt
to bring a relatively unbiased observer in to make a fresh study of the matter has
been tried before 7 The later date of this study permits an excursion into the terms
of the many statutes already enacted, as well as of those which have been proposed,
to see how they add fuel to the flames of the dispute or, alternatively, how they
meet specific objections raised by the disputants. But the real reason for this writing
is that a summary of the events underlying the controversy, the interests involved
in it, and the issues upon which the disputants have divided, seems necessary to the
present symposium, whether it achieves anything more than a summary or not.
The inadequacy of state law in this one field, as of the date of the Klauder
decision, is readily understandable in view of the considerable novelty of receivables
financing to many parts of the commercial world. Although the decline of the
trade acceptance, with its ready adaptability to the financial needs of sellers, left a
void that might have called for financing on the acceptance's widely used substitute,
the open book account," for a long time only the factors9 and the more newly
organized commercial finance companies' ° did any considerable amount of receivables financing. Their volume of business was large,"1 but it did not begin to
cover the field that now appears to be opening up for receivables financing. Apparently it took the lean years of the i93o's, with their shortage of borrowers eligible
for ordinary, unsecured commercial loans, to bring the banks into receivables financing. Until that time very little urgency was felt for modernizing the law
applicable to assignments of receivables. Some states clung to the old English rule,
with respect to the priority of successive, innocent assignees of the same intangible
'Some of it includes: Moore and Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L. J. 683, 692-696 (1945); Lowenstein, Assignments of Accounts Receivable and the
Bankruptcy Act, I RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1 (1947); Glenn, Mercantile Collateral Law-Recent Develop.
ments, 2x J. N. A. REF. BANKE. 24 (1946); Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank and
Trust Company v. Klauder Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Implications, 32 VA. L. REV. 91o, 932-933

(1946); Wright, Recording of the Assignment of Accounts Receivable to Avoid a Preference in Bankruptcy, 9 Mo. L. Ray. 167 (944); Ireton, A Proposal to Amend Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act,
A6 CoRP,. RHRG. AND AM. BANsR. REV. 257, 264 (1947); Douglas, Assigned Accounts as Affected by

Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act and the Provisions of State Law with Reference Thereto, x9 J. N. A.
REF. BANKR. 11 (1944); Hanna and Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable: Confuision of the
Present Law, the Impact of the Bankruptcy Act, and the Need for Uniform Legislation, 33 CALIF. L.
REV. 40 (1945); Oglebay, Proposed Rcvision of Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act: A Step Backward,
5x Com. L. J. 263 (1946); Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Accounts
Receivable, 44 MicsH. L. REv. 563 (946); Hanna, Some Unresolved Problems Under Section 6oa of the
Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL. L. REV. 58, 69-72 (1943); Newton, Assignment of Accounts Receivable Under

the 5943 Amendments to the California Civil Code, 17 So. CALIF. L. REv. 303 (1944); Dudley, NACM
Presents Views on 6oa, Credit and Financial Management, June, 1948, p. 7; Fechteler, Against Recordation of Assignments: An Opponent of Such Laws States His Views, Credit and Financial Management,
May, 1945; Douglas, Loans on Accounts Receivable, Banking, January, 1943, P. 45; Dudley, Should

Assignments Be Recorded?, Credit and Financial Management, August, 1942, p. 4.
"See Hanna and Koessler, supra note 6; Koessler, supra note 6.
'See
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AND NEIL H.

JACOBY, AccouNTs RECEIVABLE FINANCINo

' See Silverman, Legal and Economic Aspects of Factoring, supra.
10 See Burman, Practical Aspects of Inventory and Receivables Financing, supra.
" See SAULNIER AND JACOBY, op. cit. sutpra note 8, at 3-4, 32-38.
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right, which protected the first assignee to notify the obligor or trustee.

Some

followed the lead of New York, which simply protected the first to receive an
assignment.' 3 The Restatement of Contracts gave authority to the Massachusetts
"four-horsemen" rule, which, like the New York law, protected the first assignee

in point of time, but with exceptions in favor of the first to collect, reduce to judgment, obtain a novation, or obtain an indispensable instrument evidencing the
intangible.' 4 Perhaps in a majority of the states it was at least doubtful which
of these rules would govern. But with respect to the rights of creditors of the
assignor, it was probably clear that, short of a prior garnishment or other legal step
to "fasten upon the property for the payment of their debts,"' 5 the present assignment of a present right would prevail, unless the law relating to fraudulent conveyances could be invoked against it.1 6 In this connection, the rule of Benedict v.
Ratner'7 played a prominent role in requiring the assignee to "police his accounts"
at the peril of being subordinated to subsequently garnishing creditors and, in their
right, a trustee in bankruptcy. With respect to the rights of obligors (account
debtors), it seemed clear that prior to actual notice of the assignment they might
pay to or make a settlement with their immediate obligees or known assignees, and
would be protected in defenses and set-offs arising in their favor against such
obligees.
In this setting the factors found little need for greater legal protection. Their
known specialization, most notably in the textiles field, made it unlikely that one
of their customers could find an alternative market for his receivables without the
competing assignee's first making a thorough investigation of the prior dealings
which would necessarily warn the factor of the existence of this competition. Furthermore, since factors generally did business on a notification, non-recourse"' basis,
they were well protected against successive assignments in the English-rule states
and had good practical protection against a potential subsequent assignee in a
Massachusetts-rule state. The finance companies, which dealt considerably with
assignments taken on a non-notification basis and with recourse against the assignor, 19 simply relied on a very thorough and continuous vigilance to protect
12

Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. x,38 Eng. Rep. 475 (1828), involved the rights of successive assignees of

a beneficiary's interest in a trust, but its rule based upon notification of the trustee was extended to
apply to successive assignments of contract right involving one or more assignees who had notified the
obligor. Its name is widely given to this English rule even in its more frequent application to assignments of contract rights.
5

" Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 944 (1925); Muir v.

Schenck, 3 Hill 228 (N.Y. 1842).
See 3 WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTS, §435, n. 4 (1936).
14 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §X73 (1932).
The expression is Judge R. P. Spalding's, used by him in Wilson v. Leslie, 20 Ohio 161, x66 (1851).
10 See the excellent discussion of the "effectiveness of an assignment of a chose in action" in the
New York Law Revision Commission's Cosasusi.CAaToN AND STUY RELATING TO AssiGNMENTs OF AccouNTs REcEIvAaLE, STATE OF NEW YoR LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT No. 65(K) 25-44, especially at 30-31

(946).
17268 U. S. 353 (1925).
18
See Silverman, Legal and Economic Aspects of Factoring, supra.
19
See Burman, PracticalAspects of Inventory and Receivables Financing,supra.
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themselves against successive assignments of the same account. 20

Creditors of

factors' clients were also protected by the wide knowledge of the factors' specialization in limited fields. And while creditors of finance-company clients may have
been frequently surprised to find that their debtor's most liquid asset (next to
cash) was encumbered, the proportion of firms that became finance-company clients
remained relatively small and their creditors relied mostly on the law of fraudulent
conveyances to defeat the unknown prior encumbrances.
The events of the late Thirties changed this rather easy adaptation of modern
commerce to ancient laws. A new urgency about the state of the law arose from
three sources. In" the first place, a large group of potential entrants into the field
of lending on receivables-the banks-was not prepared to do business on the highcost basis which the finance companies' vigilant self-protection entailed, and could
not, of course, quickly attain the established position of the factors in any group of
receivables clients and, with it, the protection enjoyed by the factors. Moreover,
their entry on the high-cost level of the finance companies would have given them
no coi-petitive advantage with which to "break into" the field, and a general highcost level would have severely limited the total amount of receivables financing
that could be done.
In the second place, a perhaps greater urgency was felt by unsecured creditors
generally because of the increasing prevalence of receivables borrowing on the part
of their debtors. Of course, in the usual situation in which receivables financing
is employed to permit prompt payment of suppliers (often in order to obtain cash
discounts) and other general creditors, such creditors were not hindered but helped
by the borrowing. But this happy circumstance was no consolation in the rarer
situation where poor management used receivables financing to over-expand or
where badly pressed debtors used it to keep the wolf from the door while they sank
deeper into hopeless insolvency. Nor was the incidence of fraud on general creditors so small as to be negligible.2 1 Protection against the substantial risks which these
admittedly rarer possibilities entailed, they felt, required that they be allowed the
same access to information about the encumbering (or selling) of receivables which
the law in most commercial states provides with respect to the encumbering of any
tangible asset. That information is not provided by the English rule requiring
notification of account debtors (especially because it cannot be invoked by a mere
creditor); a fortiori it is not provided by the Massachusetts and New York rules.
The third source of urgency about modernization of the law applicable to receivables financing arose out of the Chandler Act's amendment of Section 6oa of
the Bankruptcy Act, and the Klauder case's "interpretation" of it. The Chandler
Act's "bona fide purchaser" rule meant that an assignee's protection against potential
subsequent assignees had to be good of its own force, as a matter of law, to be safe
" See id. at 559; Zinner, judging Credits in Loans on

Accounts Receivable, Robert Morris Asso-

dates Bulletin, January, 1940, p. 218; Zinner, The Contibution of Commercial Receivable Companies
and 1Factors to FinancingSmall- and Medium-Sized Buiness, 2 J. oF FActcE 76 (1947).
" See note 38, in/ra.
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against the trustee's ability to reach back four months and set aside preferences. It
was no longer enough that the assignee's ways of doing business afforded practical
protection against successive assignments; the potential bona fide purchaser became
a purely legal risk, although he was not an actual one. In the New York-rule states
an assignment for a present advance was sufficiently good of its own force; no

further perfection was necessary for protection against creditors or bona fide purchasers. Apparently at least one of the participants in the National Bankruptcy
Conference's drafting of the proposed amendments which became the Chandler

Act thought that such assignments should be good of their own force in the Englishrule states, 22 and it is unlikely that anyone anticipated difficulties for them in a
Massachusetts-rule state. However, the Klauder case confirmed the apprehension
of many that non-notification financing in an English-rule state was insecure, and
one district court decision subsequently surprised even the most apprehensive by
reaching the same result in what the court assumed to be a Massachusetts-rule jurisdiction.23 This chain of events made modernization of state law applicable to receivables financing urgent even for those already engaged in the field and adjusted
to it.

But the different sources of this urgency led to quite different demands as to
the form which modernization should take. The amendment to Section 6oa, as
a source of that urgency, would be satisfied with enactment of the New York rule
in other states; under that rule the first person to take an assignment would be
protected against bona fide purchasers and creditors from the time he took it,
and thus protected against the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. Hence
the firms already established in the field were inclined to favor the enactment of
so-called "validation" statutes-statutes simply declaring that a written assignment
of accounts receivable (sometimes required to be for value) shall be valid against
creditors and subsequent assignees from the time it is made. Some sought to
achieve the collateral objective of relaxing harsher extensions of the New York rule
of Benedict v. Ratner2 4 by including in their proposed validation statutes an adoption of the 1943 amendment to Section 45 of the New York Personal Property Law,
to the effect that an assignor's dealing with returned goods as his own, or granting
credits, allowances, or adjustments to account debtors-with or without the acquiescence or consent of the assignee-will not invalidate the assignment.
These
validation statutes have become law in fifteen states, with or without such variations
"See McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 6o HAav. L. Rtv. 233, 246-247 (1946).
"In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (ED. Mo. '943). But see In re Rosen, 157 F. 2d 997
(C.C.A. 3d 1946).
24 268 U. S. 353 (1925). The doctrine of ,this case had been extended in Lee v. State Bank & Trust
Co., 38 F. 2d 45 (C.C.A. 2d 1930), modified on second appeal, 54 F. 2d 518 (C.C.A. 2d 1931), cert.
denied, 285 U. S. 547 (1932), to invalidate an assignment where the assignor had been allowed to deal
with returned goods as his own.
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as that dealing with the Benedict v. Ratner rule.25 One of them, the Connecticut
act, 20 contains a collateral provision requiring "any person who prepares any financial statement of any debtor" to "include in such statement an itemized list of all
assigned accounts of which he has knowledge with the names of the assignees," on
penalty of fine and imprisonment.
But the urgency felt by banks, which were not already established in the field,
and by credit men, who most often found themselves or their clients in the position
of unsecured creditors, arose out of the other considerations mentioned as much
as it did out of the amendment to Section 6oa? 7 Although two states passed
"bookmarking" statutes 28 to meet these sources of urgency, the banking and creditor
-groups generally rallied-behind proposals for "notice-filing" legislation, and such
statutes have been enacted in twelve states.2 9 Patterned on the filing provisions of
Ark. Laws 1945, No. x8

"Arkansas:
Connecticut:
-

-Illinois:
Indiana:

Maine:
Maryland:
Massachusetts:
Michigan:

CONN. GEN STAT. §§876h-885h, 918h-926h (Supp. 1945)
ILL. STrAT. ANN. §§1o9.312(1)-109.312(3) (Supp. 1946)
IND. ANN. STAT. §§19-21oi-19-21o4 (Burns Supp. 1945)
Me. Laws 1945, c. 100
MD. ANN. CODE art. 8, §1A (Supp. 1943)
MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 1o7A, §§1-6 (947)
Mscu. STAr. ANN. §§19.841-19.852 (Supp. 1946)
MINx. STAT. ANN. §§521.0I-521.07 (1947)

Minnesota:
New Harupshire:- N. H. Laws 1945, c. X9
-

Oregon:
Rhode Island:
South Dakota:

-

ORE. CoM. LAws ANN. §62a-zoi (Supp. 1945)
R. 1; LaWs 1945, C. 1345
S. D, Laws 1945, C. 213

Virginia:
VA. CODE ANN. §5767a (Supp. 1946)
Wisconsin:
WIsC. STAT. §241.28 (1945).
The Michigan statute is included in this list, rather than in the list of notice-filing statutes, although
it contains some notice-filing provisions. These require that publicity be given to assignments made for
an antecedent debt, but to no others. Obviously such provisions do not meet the demand for legal
protection against successive assignments, nor do they fully meet the need that general creditors feel
for a check on the accuracy of financial statements. Even less do they meet the need of protecting
general creditors against the fabrication of evidence of security as of the date advances were made to
conceal the fact that security has actually been given for an antecedent debt. See note 38, inlra.
8
" CONN. GEN. STAT. §88 3 h (Supp. 1943).
" This abbreviated statement of the history of the controversy tends to over-categorize the interests
which have taken a stand on one side or the other. Not all banks, by any means, now consider themselves "newcomers" to the field of receivables financing, and bankers are divided as to their preference
for notice-filing over validation. Although they are probably not representative of the views of the
American Bankers Association, the State Bankers Associations of California, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York appear to have taken positions in favor of validation statutes
and inconsistent with the "newcomer's" feeling of urgency I here describe. Similarly, although the
National Association of Credit Men has been one of the foremost advocates of notice-filing legislation,
the Association of Credit Men of the City of New York appears to have taken a position inconsistent
with that of the parent body. On the other side, too, some representatives of the factors seem to be
at least lukewarm to the anti-notice-filing position which I have put in their mouths.
"8 GA. CoDE ANN. §85-1803 (Supp. 1945); PA. STAT. ANN. C. 5, §§561-563 (Supp. 1946).
"California:
CAL. Civ. CODE §§3017-3029 (Supp. 1947)
Colorado:
Colo. Laws 1947; C. 120
Florida:
Fla. Laws 1947, c. 24297
Idaho:
Idaho Laws 1945, c. 172
Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN. C. x8, art. 4, H§§-6 (Thomas' Cum. Supp. 1944)
Missouri:
North Carolina: N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§44-77-44-84 (Supp. 1945)

Ohio:

Omo

Oklahoma:

Omu.

GEN. CODE ANN. §§8509-3-8509-6 (Supp. 1946)
SrAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§631-637 (Supp. 1947)
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the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and of several of the factors' lien

acts,3 0
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this legis-

lation requires as a condition to an assignment's validity against creditors and
subsequent assignees (i) a written instrument of assignment, and (:) a notice of
intention to assign, filed in a specified public place, naming the assignee and assignor
and giving their addresses, although not specifying the individual assignments nor
itemizing the accounts assigned. Although opponents of these statutes misname
them "recording acts," it is important to note that, unlike recording acts, they- do
not require a record of each assignment but are satisfied by the filing of this single,
simple notice of intention to assign, which will protect any number of assignments
made during the period it is in force. To obtain exact information as to which
accounts have been assigned and for what obligations, the inquirer is compelled to
seek out the named assignee or assignor. Needless to say, the simpler notice-filing
requirement permits a flexibility and informality in financing arrangements that
could not be achieved under a recording act. In addition, it withholds detailed
information concerning the financial arrangements from all but those who can
persuade one of the- parties that their interest in the information is legitimate.
The rest of the general pattern of the notice-filing statutes is as follows: The
statute will define the priority that successive assignees of the same account will
enjoy, according priority either to the first to file a notice or to the first to do the
two acts concurrently required for protection: (i) the taking of a written assignment and (2) the filing of a notice. Fulfillment of the requirements for such

priority, of course, qualifies the assignee for protection against the "bona fide purchaser" test of Section 6oa. The statute will usually provide a time limit to the
effectiveness of the filed notice, with provisions for renewal without interruption of
the protection afforded. It will usually provide for the filing of a cancellation notice
terminating the effectiveness of the original notice so that protection: may be given
to a new assignee upon his qualifying. Provision is usually made excepting the
account debtors from any constructive-notice effect of the filing and protecting them
in their payments to, settlements with, and defenses and set-offs arising against the
account creditor (the assignor) prior to actual notice of the assignment. Like the
validation statutes, these notice-filing statutes frequently contain collateral provisions,
one modifying the extensions of the rule in Benedict v. Ratner in the manner of
Section 45 of the New York Personal Property Law being the most common.
The sometimes quite bitter controversy between the proponents of these two
alternative efforts to modernize the law relating to assignments of accounts receivable
continues to turn up a great number of individual issues of division between them.
Since the controversy continues to rage over the enactment of one or the other of
these two types of legislation in states which have not yet spoken, over a federal
South Carolina: S. C. Laws 1946, No. 433
Texas:
TEx. STAr. art. z6o-i (Supp. 1945)
Utah:
UTAH CODE ANN. §§8*B-o-i-8xB-o-7 (Supp. 1945)
Washington:
Wash. Laws 1947, c. 8.
80 See Silverman, Legal and Economic Aspects of Factoring, supra.
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notice-filing proposal for amendment of the Bankruptcy Act,31 and over the pertinent provisions of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code,32 there is point to an
inquiry into its fundamental elements. I suggest that the essential difference between the two opposing camps relates to the choice between two interests competing for predominance: the interest of borrowers (and of the lenders who seek
the business of those borrowers) in a certain amount of secrecy attendant upon
their methods of financing, and the interest of certain outsiders in full information
respecting these same methods of financing. On behalf of the borrowers there is
no assertion of a desire for complete secrecy; the legitimate interest of existing and
potential creditors in complete knowledge of their debtors' financial arrangements
is acknowledged. 33 But the borrowers deeply fear a notoriety that will escape these
limits and let customers, and perhaps their own employees, know that they are
"hocking their receivables." On the other hand, the "outsiders" do not assert that
every member of the public is legitimately interested in the financial arrangements
of a borrower. They agree that the legitimately interested include only those who are
creditors of the borrower, present or potential, including such as propose also to
extend credit on the security of an assignment of accounts receivable. But they
do not agree that the borrowers can assure them that this limited group will obtain
tie information to which it is entitled, otherwise than by publicizing it in the
manner which the borrowers abhor. Clearly, there are risks that information which
.need not be publicized generally will be kept secret from even those who are
legitimately interested. Equally clearly, there are risks that information concerning
a part of a business's financial arrangements, if publicized, will be misused or misconstrued, to the detriment of that business. The essential difference between these
two groups concerns the questions, which of these risks is the more serious, and
which interest should be preserved.
The interest of borrowers in secrecy in these transactions is one which is peculiar
to the subject of receivables financing. Long-standing prejudices associate the "hocking of receivables" with financial shakiness in a way in which ordinary mortgages
and pledges of tangible assets are not associated. Interestingly enough, this taint may
have some basis in the very obsolescence of the law that was applicable to receivables financing prior to 1941. It stems from a notion that because this financing was costly and because it was insecure (and, of course, it was costly be"1 A bill, H.R. 5834, introduced by Representative Hobbs into the Eightieth Congress, second session,
cohtained in its Section 2 an amendment to Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, which would have added
a subsection (i) requiring, for the validity of an assignment against the trustee of an assignor, the filing
of a notice of intention to assign with the clerk of the proper federal district court, unless the comparable provisions of an applicable state notice-filing statute had been complied with. The bill was not
enacted by the Eightieth Congress.
5
" Article VII, Part III (Tentative Draft No. i) of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, being
drafted by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, provides for an "inventory lien" on tangibles and accounts receivable which form a part of the
inventory of a business.

A condition precedent to the validity of the inventory lien against third parties

would be the filing of a "financing statement" indicating that a named "financer" has or expects to have
a lien on inventory of a type described in the statement belonging to a named "borrower."
"' But see SAULNIER AND JAcOBY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 22.
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cause it was insecure) no borrower would seek it unless he were really hard up and
no lender would take receivables as security unless he were already in too deep to
get out in any better way. Although extra-legal hazards-frauds of all typeswere also responsible, this high cost to the borrower and this inherent insecurity to
the lender were both due in some measure to the legal hazards.
If customers accept information concerning a business's receivables financing as
evidence of financial distress, they may be driven to place their orders elsewhere;
hence this particular interest of borrowers in secrecy is closely associated with business success during the period of credit extension and, hence, with ability to repay.
Thus, put in their strongest terms, the assertions on behalf of this interest picture
an assignment of accounts receivable under legislation requiring publicity as something less than a workable security device, for the publicity will interfere with the
borrower's ability to repay as well as his ability to prosper with the aid of the credit
extended to him. In such terms, the present dispute turns on issues identical with
those of all of the long series of earlier conflicts between the desire for workable
security devices and the desire to avoid secret liens. The present dispute is notable
for the fact that the part of the secrecy-seeking borrower is taken by his lendersthe finance companies and the factors-who have frequently espoused publicity
requirements for other security devices and, in doing so, have helped to resolve the
basic conflict by accomplishing, in legislative provisions for workable security devices, the avoidance of secret liens.
The opponents of notice-filing legislation make many points other than this
basic one. Related to the basic point is the argument, of which they make much,
that they (the finance companies and the factors) are espousing the cause of small
business, for it is the "smalls" who require recivables financing to obtain necessary
working capital, since they cannot obtain it on their unsecured obligations. Moreover, it is the "smalls" who will lose customers to the "bigs" if word of their receivables borrowing is allowed to create an assumption that they are in unusual financial
straits and are unlikely to be able to fill their customers' orders and to fulfill their
obligations. Not only do these lenders seek, by this argument, to enlist one's
sympathy for the underdog; through it they also seek to establish a socially useful
role for modern receivables financing which, in part, contradicts the old prejudice
which associates such financing with distress measures, upon which the argument
for secrecy is based. This paradox is no accident; the finance companies and the
factors are, of course, quick to assert the social usefulness inherent in the type of
financing which they have done so much to build. But that receivables financing
is widespread, respectable, socially useful, and desirable in no way contradicts the
fact-so they assert-that a good many people are unaware of how widespread and
respectable it is, and continue to harbor the ancient prejudice. What is more, it
may be impossible, in terms -of the foreseeable future, so to educate the public as to
erase that prejudice.
Not only do the proponents of notice-filing legislation underestimate the risk,
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the opponents contend; they also overemphasize the usefulness of and the need for
publicity as an aid to those outsiders who are legitimately interested in the affairs
of the receivables borrower. On the score of usefulness, they point out that a creditor who sought to obtain information concerning the status of a debtor's receivables
through the public files would bear a cross of untold weight 4 He must first
decide which state's (or states') law is applicable to his debtor's assignments, and
in which of the possibly several filing places within a state notices regarding that
debtor's assignments would have to be filed. Doubts on these scores would have
to be covered by multiple inquiry. Should he find the right office and learn that
no notice had been filed, he would still know only that up to that time no protected
assignment had been made. A notice filed at any time thereafter would still protect
an assignment which would have priority over his unsecured claim. And if he
should find, on the other hand, that a notice was on file, he still would have learned
no details but would simply be directed to do what he should have done in the
first place-make direct inquiry of the debtor himself both as to what accounts he
has assigned and as to what assignments he intends to make during the future
period in which this creditor will be interested in him. The argument makes the
creditor who would rely on the public files look ridiculous; yet it is impossible to
label it with a more generous word than "camouflage." No proponent of noicefiling legislation asserts that the information which would be supplied should serve
as a substitute for a thorough credit investigation which, among other things, should
require the debtor himself to supply every relevant and available detail. The only
argument advanced in support of notice filing, on this score, is that the information
it would supply is necessary as a supplement to such a credit investigation-an independent check on the word of the debtor.
But on the score of need the argument advanced by the opponents is not so inherently weak. They contend that a creditor who does follow the prudent course
of making a thorough credit investigation, aided as he is by the severe legal penalties
attaching to fraudulent misrepresentations for the purpose of procuring credit, and
also aided by such independent information as is supplied by the credit-reporting
agencies, does not really need the aid of notice-filing publicity to insure that he will
learn of a prior encumbrance or sale of receivables. Suppliers can and customarily
do insist upon financial statements on forms which, in addition to calling for full
details, require an, answer to a question such as: "Have you assigned, or do you
intend to assign, any accounts receivable?" (And, according to the testimony of
an attorney experienced in this field, such statements are customarily returned with
that one question left unanswered.) 35 Of course, a potential second assignee will
have inquired about prior assignments before extending credit. The incidence of
fraud is almost negligible, according to the lender-opponents, and, of course, they
" Fechteler, Against Recordation of Assignments: An Opponent of Such Laws States His View,
Credit and Financial Management, May, 1945.
"nSee the testimony of W. Randolph Montgomery before the New York Law Revision Commission
on September 2z, 1945, reported in STATE OF Naw YORK, LEGIsLATIVE DOCUMENT No. 65(K) 270 (1946).
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are in a peculiarly good position to cite their own experience in support of the
assertion, at least as it relates to fraud on competing assignees. 36 However, their
own experience has also been coupled with many conditions well designed to reduce
the incidence of fraud, as the previous discussion of their adjustment to the obsolete
legal situation prior to 1941 has pointed out. A terrific expense designed explicitly
to eliminate fraud (on them) might have been expected to keep the incidence of
fraud, within the experience of the finance companies, at a minimum. A fairly
notorious specialization in the financing of certain industries might similarly have
been expected to reduce the amount of fraud, in the form of duplicate assignments,
committed on the factors. Nor are the factors noted for laxity in the policing of
their accounts. Although these older hands at the game have gotten along well
without a requirement of notoriety regarding assignments of receivables to protect
them, there is evidence that others, newer to the game, have put existing noticefiling systems to use and that they believe that in so doing they are securing pro37
tection at a lower cost.
But at least as important as the fraud-with respect to which the experience of
the older hands is peculiar-are the injuries which secrecy may lead a borrower to
inflict on his general creditors3 s To the extent that the finance companies assert
"8 Factors appropriately add that their experience is unusually broad, for, as purchasers of receivables,
they have become the largest single group of all the unsecured creditors. But their specialization tends
also to keep their unsecured obligations grouped in the industries which are known to depend on factoring, and at the end of the line of the firms in such an industry the last factoring client sells the
unsecured obligations of retailers who, normally, do no receivables financing at all. But see Zinner,
The Contribution of Commercial Receivable Companies and Factors to Financing Small- and MediumSized Business, 2 J. OF FINANCE 76, 85-86 (1947). Thus, although the factors are substantial unsecured
creditors, they are likely to be creditors of firms which are either known to be doing receivables financing or known with reasonable certainty not to be doing it. Of course, to the extent that factoring,
like all receivables financing, has in recent years tended to expand into new fields, this point becomes
applicable less to their current experience than to their long-range experience.
"A 'questionnaire directed to bankers in California and Missouri, published with the answers in
mimeographed form by the Legal Department of the American Bankers Association in January, z947,
tends to support a conclusion that the limited experience of bankers under the notice-filing legislation
of those two states has been happier than the more experienced finance-company officers would have
predicted.
Of course, it is true that there are many opportunities for fraud on assignees of receivables which
are not touched by notice-filing. Mr. Zinner lists the following as representative of the frauds against
which expensive vigilance is necessary: duplicate assignments, use of remittances without accounting
therefor, failure to credit returned merchandise or to show exceptional discounts, fake shipments and
bills of lading, checks exchanged for purposes of misrepresentation, consigned merchandise, diversion
of merchandise in transit, collusion of all types between the buyer and the seller, falsified books. Zinner,
Judging Credits in Loans on Accounts Receivable, Robert Morris Associates Bulletin, January, 1940, p. 218.
But distinguishing the frauds which notice-filing will not curb does not serve to establish that the
remaining ones are less real in the receivables field than they are in the fields of financing on the security
of tangibles.
"SThe unsecured-creditor interests which favor notice-filing legislation hope for the prevention of
two types of injury. The more obvious hope is that the publicity requirement will eliminate unwitting,
but not non-diligent, reliance on the availability of receivables for the satisfaction of unsecured claims,
or, stated otherwise, that receivables will not be secretly encumbered with the proceeds going into unproductive use. Less obviously they are concerned with the possibility of a type of fraud the extent of
which can never be measured: the successful fabrication of evidence of security as of an earlier date than
that on which the intention to give security was actually formed. If the date of the assignment is the
date as of which the elements of a preference are to be tested under Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act,
the evidence of that date will consist largely of documents solely within the control of the parties. But if
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that a danger of this sort of injury does not exist, they contradict all the experience
that has gone into the requirements of notoriety attendant upon other transactions
by a debtor in his property-the possession of the pledgee, the recording of mortgages
and conditional sales, the notice to creditors in bulk sales, the filing of notice of
intention to do trust-receipts or factors'lien financing-and all of that part of the
law of fraudulent conveyances which deals with fraudulent retention of possession.
They may be right and the ancients wrong; notoriety may be a very clumsy way
to insure protection against this type of injury, and quite unnecessary. But at least
on this score the argument cannot assert that it pits one small group's experience
against everyman's ignorance.
At this point the opponent is reminded of another of his complaints against
notice-filing legislation, or rather two of them. The fallacy of this notice-filing
proposal is betrayed, he asserts, by the sort of comparison to mortgages, pledges, etc.
that has just been made. The fact is that those are transactions involving tangibles,
while receivables are an entirely different species of property: they are intangibles.
Hence there can be no "ostensible ownership" of receivables, and the need of a
notorious act to remedy the false appearance created by possession does not exist
here. Second, since the assignment of receivables creates a security interest only in
intangibles, it is peculiarly unfair to the parties doing this type of financing to
single it out for a requirement of publicity, without similarly requiring publicity
for borrowings on the discount of commercial paper or on an unsecured basis. Even
unsecured borrowing, "if it be unbalanced in amount, may adversely affect his credit
quite as much as, if not more than, a reasonable amount of secured borrowing."3 9
These two arguments rest on the premise that there is a greater similarity between receivables financing and unsecured borrowing than there is between receivables financing and financing on the security of tangibles. The reference in
the second argument to the discounting of commercial paper seems wholly to ignore
the similarity of the legal treatment of dealings in commercial paper with the requirements for a pledge of tangible chattels. There is an inference of ownership
of commercial paper associated with possession that is in accord with the tenor of
the paper, but the evil of ostensible ownership is sought to be remedied by the
requirement of a transfer of possession. Hence there has been assumed to be no
more need for additional requirements of notoriety for a pledge or discount of
commercial paper than there is for a pledge of tangible chattels. Again, the ancients
may be wrong in their reliance on possession as an effective guide to ownership, but
they have clearly put their reliance on a workable protection for innocent dealings
the date of the filing of a notice is the earliest date as of which those elements can be tested, there is
objective, outside evidence of that date which is beyond the power of the parties to fabricate or modify.
Of course, notice filing does not perform the function of preserving such objective evidence as cffcctively as does a recording statute; but creditors are not fearful of being hurt in the situation in which a
notice has been filed long prior to the giving of an assignment.
" Supplemental Statement in Opposition to H. R. 5834, of John Hanna, J. Francis Ireton, Milton P.
Kupfer, and Homer J. Livingston, in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and Reorganiza.
tion of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.. R. 2412 and H. R. 5834, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 32
(1948).

NoTIcE FILING FOR ASSIGNMENTS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE

with a debtor; dealings in commercial paper do not constitute a casus omissus in
the legal context in which the current proposal is made.
The assumption of similarity between receivables financing and unsecured borrowing seems extremely difficult to justify. It is based on the proposition that
there can be no ostensible ownership of an open account, that innocent parties
dealing with the account creditor will not justifiably rely on his assertions of ownership as they would upon similar assertions with respect to tangibles in his possession. But if a firm is known to do business with its customers on a credit basisa fact that can be ascertained independently of the borrower's own assertions-why
should its creditor not expect to find receivables among its assets? And if the
creditor knows that fact and has a financial statement detailing the accounts and
asserting ownership in them, in what respect has he done less than one who relies
on the debtor's possession of tangible assets and his assertion of ownership in them?
Why does he need additional legal protection in one case and not in the other?
These questions are not intended to contradict the proposition that a debtor
may injure his creditors by over-borrowing on his unsecured credit. Perhaps he
should not be privileged, as he now is, to avoid notoriety concerning his unsecured
financing. But it is hard to see that a law which fails to require such notoriety
unfairly discriminates in distinguishing his secured borrowing from his unsecured,
and requiring that it be notorious. On the contrary, it might be more legitimate to
object that the validation statutes discriminate unfairly in their especially lenient
treatment of this one form of secured financing.
An attempt to set forth the basic issues in dispute cannot afford to ignore what
the parties say of each other as to the "real' motives underlying their supplications

to the legislators. In their respective arsenals, these disputants do have certain ad
hominem arguments which, valid or not, seem to color the positions they take. On
the one hand, the opponents of notice filing assert that the banks, the newcomers
to this field, really seek the publicity requirement only in order to enable themselves to learn the identity of and to raid the present customers of the finance
companies; and they assert that the real motive of the credit men is the creation
of a new legal obstacle to the perfection of a security-preferably a complicated,
unpredictable obstacle which will haphazardly throw any number of legitimately
secured creditors into the limbo of the unsecured in the event of bankruptcy or
other liquidation. On the other hand, the proponents of notice filing assert that
it is the opponents-especially the finance companies-whose motives are impure.

These interests oppose notice-filing legislation, it is asserted, in the hope of keeping
competition out of the field-in the fear that with the legislation many banks will
venture into the field with lower rates. Although there has been some effort to'
appraise at least one of these claims, 40 a studied appraisal of them seems beyond

the reach of an outsider.

"0 The American Bankers Association questionnaire inquired whether, as an effect of the California

and Missouri notice-filing statutes upon !competition among financing agencies, there had been any
"pirating" of customers. The answers denied that there had been "pirating," but indicated that the
statutes had put the banks in a better competitive position visa vis the finance companies and had won
the banks some of the finance companies' customers. See note 37 supra.
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The opponents of notice-filing legislation make their most telling points, however, when they turn to criticism of the provisions of existing legislation of that
kind. Their quite valid criticisms are directed at features which may be categorized
as follows: (i) provisions defining the point at which "perfection" occurs and determining the priorities among successive assignees, (2) provisions specifying the
place of filing and affecting the question of what law is to govern an individual
transaction, and (3) collateral features.
i. The provisions specifying when "perfection" occurs fill the need for certainty
as to the application of Section 6oa to an assignment of receivables. Invariably
they require the assignee to accomplish both the taking of a written assignment and
the filing of a notice to achieve "perfection." But the priority among successive
assignees of the same accounts, when each has taken both of the steps necessary
to perfection of his assignment, is determined differently under different statutes.
One type of provision awards priority to the assignee who is first to do both-to
take an assignment and to file a notice. 41 Under such a statute a lender willing
to finance under a continuous, "revolving-credit" arrangement will find himself
hampered by the necessity of a re-search of the files preliminary to the taking of
each new assignment. Although there is already an effective notice on file, a competing assignee, by filing a subsequent notice, will become entitled to priority
thereafter in all accounts which are first assigned to him. Actually, a lender on
receivables is no worse off under this first-to-do-both priority than are his brothers
in the validation-statute states; should be neglect to re-search the files before taking
each assignment he will assume the same risk that this brother assumes in every
assignment he takes-the risk that someone else will have taken a prior assignment
of the same accounts. But the provision is hardly an ideal one for the lender; it
meets only inadequately the need felt by the banks for legal protection against
successive assignments.
However, an attempt to meet this objection by changing to a "first-to-file" priority-i.e., a provision that the first to file a notice takes a prior right in every
assignment made under that notice-may only give the critics a chance to say,
"Heads I win, tails you lose." The first-to-file priority, adopted in several of the
existing statutes, is subjected to the even more severe criticism that it tends to give one
lender a "monopoly" on the receivables financing of each assignor with respect to
whom he has filed. During the statutory period of effectiveness of his notice
(usually one or three years) no competing lender can be wholly comfortable in
taking an assignment of receivables from the same assignor. This objection is met
to the extent that the notice-filing statute effectively (i) requires that the assignee
bind himself on the request of the assignor by a statement to any specified person
detailing the accounts then held by him, and (2) either (a) protects later-filing
assignees against first-filing ones who take with actual knowledge of a prior out" The Californiai Idaho, Missouri, Utah, and Washington statutes are of this type.
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standing interest, or (b) provides for effective cancellation of an existing notice. But
seven states42 make no express provision imposing a duty on the filing assignee to
disclose the details of his position on request. Thus in most of the states which
provide a first-to-file priority, a later-filing assignee will be forced to rely wholly on
his assignor's good faith, or on the speculative protection of an estoppel by silence,
if he wishes to compete with an uncooperative first-filing assignee.
But even if a later-filing assignee has reliable information as to what accounts
have been assigned to his first-filing competitor, he will require assurance that the
accounts he thereupon proceeds to accept cannot be subsequently assigned to the
higher-priority competitor. Three of the statutes adopt the provisions of the American Bankers Association draft43 subjecting a first-filing assignee to prior assignments of which he has written notice; Missouri subjects him to those of which he
has "actual notice"; but the rest are silent as to the effect of actual notice. More
effective protection against this risk is the objective of the few statutes which require
the assignee to cancel his filed notice upon demand and satisfaction of outstanding
balances, but only one of these, California's, imposes sanctions compelling performance of this duty. 44 The North Carolina statute permits the assignor to file
a "notice of discontinuance" if he also serves it on his assignee; but this device leaves
protected any accounts which may have been previously assigned, and compels the
competing lender to rely upon the effectiveness of the unsanctioned statutory duty
of the first-filing assignee to disclose the accounts he holds for assurance against
the possibility that he is not taking some of those still-protected, previously assigned
accounts. 45 The rest of the states, of course, permit the assignee to file a notice of
cancellation, but seem to rely on the ability of the borrower to compel its production
by conditioning his tender of repayment on it, as he might compel the cancellation
or release of a mortgage-a somewhat ineffective compulsion in a self-liquidating
financing arrangement which authorizes the lender to notify account debtors and
collect from them on his own behalf. Thus, although the first-to-file priority
affords the most workable protection to a continuing financing arrangement, 46 the
"Florida, Idaho, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. The list includes two firstto-do-both states, in which the need for such a provision is less acute.
"(Colorado, Florida, and Oklahoma.
"' But California's duty of the assignee to execute a discharge, and the penalties for non-performance,
are available only if the original notice listed the specific accounts assigned and specified the obligation
which they secured.
"' The North Carolina statute strangely gives the "cancellation" of a notice by the assignee this same
effect of leaving protected previously assigned accounts, so that a subsequent assignee would have to
know that his accounts could not have been previously assigned to know that he is getting the highest
right in them. Since the "cancellation" would not have to be given until the first-filing assignee had
been satisfied, the need for this qualification on its effect, which feeds the "monopoly" argument, is
difficult to perceive.
"Mr. McGowan opposes interpretation of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act as granting "first-filing"
priority on policy grounds which do not apply to notice-filing for assignments of receivables. See
GEOrPGE B. McGowAN, TRusr Racmi'rs 124, n. 24 (1947). The only decision under the Act, up to
the time of his publication, had denied first-filing priority, but one commentator had taken a position
in favor of it. McGowan's criticism is that it would "encourage carelessness, if not outright bad faith,
on the part of the first who filed." The policy of the Trust Receipts Act, to encourage trust receipts
financing of the acquisition of inventory rather than financing secured by inventory already on hand,
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position of the protected assignee under most of the statutes which now provide
first-to-file priority is unduly embarrassing to potential competition.

But if the first-to-file priority and the first-to-do-both are alike short of perfection, at least neither of them falls quite so far short of the underlying aims of the
notice-filing proposal as do the Missouri and North Carolina statutes. Under them
perfection of a written assignment may be attained either by filing a notice or by
notification of the account debtors. Within these provisions for alternative ways of
perfection, Missouri accords priorities among successive assignees on a first-to-doboth basis (so that a first-filing assignee could be defeated by an assignee who had
taken an earlier assignment and then either filed or notified account debtors),
while North Carolina accords a first-to-file priority (so that a first-filing assignee,
if he were not already, perhaps unknowingly, subordinated to a prior assignment
which had been perfected by notification of account debtors, would be fully protected in all assignments he took under his filing). In Missouri, therefore, a lender
will not even be assured by a re-search of the files before taking each assignment,
and in neither state will general creditors find in the files any satisfactory check on
a debtor's financial statements. 47 Of course, it is at least a slight added convenience
to factors and others who do business on a notification basis to be relieved of the
necessity of filing in these two states; but even such a financer, in North Carolina,
were he not in a position to rely completely on the good faith of his customer, would
be obliged to re-search the files prior to taking each new assignment unless he were
himself to file.
A remaining observation might be made with regard to the provisions determining when "perfection" occurs. Only one of the existing statutes requires an
assignee who takes his assignment before filing his notice to file within a limited
time: Washington requires the notice to be filed within ten days after the assignment. California goes farther in the protection of creditors against non-publicized,
later-perfected encumbrances; it protects the assignment only if the notice is filed
first. The rest of the notice-filing states rely solely on the assignee's fear of Section
6oa and of a subsequent assignment of the same accounts to induce prompt filing
of a notice, and hence fulfillment of the general creditor's interest in the noticemakes his point applicable only to that Act. An entruster financing the acquisition of inventory may
legitimately rely on the apparently obvious fact that no other creditor of his trustee will have a prior
lien on the inventory which is only just being acquired; it might not occur to him to search the trust
receipts files before extending credit on such security. But if first-filing priority obtains, a prior-filing
entrusier of that trustee might carelessly or in bad faith take a subsequent security interest in that same
inventory by trust receipt (at least in Indiana, Illinois, and Connecticut--see id. at 52), and because of
his prior filing take precedence over the prior entruster. For that reason McGowan advocates interpretation of the Trust Receipts Act as protecting the first entruster to advance new value, if he files within
the thirty-day period. Such considerations do not apply to accounts receivable financing; there is neither
any policy favoring acquisition financing of receivables (because such financing does not exist), nor is
there any danger that a lender on receivables will be lulled into a false sense of security arising from a
belief that, in the nature of things, his must be the first interest that could have been created in that
security by that borrower.
"T Missouri and North Carolina creditors will get some assurance from the lack of a notice on file
against a debtor whose business is such that he would not be likely to turn to notification financing.
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filing requirement.

While this inducement is probably quite adequate to accom-

plish prompt filing, and while the California provision is probably too rigid, the
Washington provision does have this advantage: for purposes of the application of

Section 6oa's definition of a preference, it supplies a standard to aid an interpretation
of that definition that will not cause a reasonable interval between the making of
an assignment and the perfection of it to convert what was a transfer as security
for a present advance into a preferential security for an antecedent debt.48
2. The differing provisions governing the place of filing raise the collateral dispute as to the preferability of central over local filing. Six states of the twelve
accept the central-filing answer, using the office of the Secretary of State. 49 Although (to the extent that local creditors rather than distant suppliers and wellequipped credit-reporting agencies are the primary beneficiaries of the notice-filing
requirement) the county-filing statutes fill a need which central filing cannot touch,
the six statutes which require county filing give some ammunition to one of the
more effective arguments that is made by opponents of this legislation. To require
a lender to determine, at the peril of losing his security, what law governs and what
is the proper filing place for an assignment from a borrower whose business sprawls
over several counties in several states, both for the purpose of deciding where to
file and for that of deciding where to look for prior filings, is to impose new risks
on transactions that may involve tremendous sums. Of course, multiple filing and
multiple searches provide a somewhat annoying but otherwise satisfactory solution
whenever the transaction involves amounts large enough to justify the slight additional expense. Still, the central-filing statutes greatly simplify the assignee's decisions. And the suggestion of the American Bankers Association, adopted in the Florida and Colorado central-filing statutes, that the filing provisions extend only to assignors whose "main executive office in the United States is in fact located in this
State," appear to provide at least a rule of exclusion, if not one of inclusion, for
settling choice-of-law uncertainties. If these statutes may be interpreted as providing a rule for the choice of law, both of exclusion and of inclusion, the rule would
seem to be ideal. The interest of Florida is in protecting parties dealing with
Florida assignors, rather than in extraneous considerations as to where the account
may be "located," or where the assignment was made. Similarly, lenders and
general creditors are concerned to know what law governs a particular debtor's
dealings in his receivables rather than what various laws govern his various individual accounts or individual assignments by him.
By contrast, the North Carolina statute's explicit provision governing the choice

of law results in a much less satisfactory rule. The statute provides that an account
"' Compare the provisions of the proposed amendment to Section 6oa contained in H.R. 24z12, H.R.
5834, and S. 826, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), which would impose a thirty-day limit, unless applicable
state law imposes a shorter one, on the delay with which a transferee may perfect his transfer without
converting a transfer for present consideration into one for an antecedent debt. See the discussion of
the proposed amendment in Kupfer, Progress in the Amendment of Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act,
supra p. 624.
" Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Missouri, Utah, and Washington.
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"shall be deemed located in this state" if the transaction out of which it arose oc.
curred there, if it is to be paid there, if its place of payment has been transferred to
that state, or if "under general rules of law" it is deemed located there. 50 Consider
the remoteness of the possibility that a New York lender to a New York firm
woul d think of filing a notice in North Carolina (in what county would he file?)
because some of the accounts assigned arose out of sales "made" in North Carolina
by a traveling representative.
In general, the county-filing statutes, though they do not contain explicit choice
of law provisions, appear to create much more uncertainty in this respect than the
central-filing ones do. Most strikingly, California does this by indicating in its
requirements respecting the contents of a notice that it contemplates that an assignor who has neither a residence nor a place of business within the state might be
expected to file under its statute, and yet making no provision respecting the county
in which such as assignor's notice should be filed. Texas and Oklahoma specify a
single county in which such an assignor's notice should be filed.
3. The collateral provisions in notice-filing statutes deal most frequently with
the rule and extensions of Benedict v. Ratner, the rights of a protected assignee in
proceeds, and the rights of account debtors.
In providing a new hurdle in the way of perfection of assignments of receivables,
most notice-filing statutes have also sought to eliminate or narrow an old one.
Benedict v. Ratner held invalid as against a trustee in bankruptcy an assignment
which, as interpreted by the parties' conduct, did not require the assignor to account to the assignee for the proceeds collected by him but permitted him to use
them in the conduct of his business. This case provided unsecured creditors with
a weapon for striking down poorly managed arrangements which, when its force
was avoided by good management, did them very little real good. It did fasten
upon one type of objective conduct tending to prove that the intention to give
security was really formed at the time of the credit extension and that the documents evidencing security were not sham. But it gave no notoriety to the assignment. And, though the case purported to apply only New York law, it has been
followed and extended both in New York and elsewhere to an extent that leaves
the status of the rule, or at least the outer limits of it, uncertain in a great many
places. It remains a sword of Damocles hanging over many legitimate security
devices. To the extent that notice filing provides a substitute type of objective
conduct to evidence the actual existence of an intention to give security at the time
as of which security is claimed, 5 ' this function of Benedict v. Ratner is no longer
needed.
Most of the statutes, following the lead of the American Bankers Association
draft, have adopted the 1943 amendment to Section 45 of the New York Personal
Property Law, which protects the assignee despite his consent to the assignor's
dealing with returned goods as his own or granting credits, allowances, or adjusto N.C. GEEr. STrT. §§44-78(5) (Supp. 1947).

"' See note 38 supra.
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ments to account debtors. This cuts down extensions of the rule but does not touch
the holding in Benedict v. Ratner itself, presumably in the belief that it remains
desirable to continue to penalize the central "sin" of allowing the assignor more

or less unlimited use of proceeds in the conduct of his business. But since the
decisional law on this subject in many states, unlike New York, is still uncertain,
it would seem wiser to have spelled that purpose out. But an even better way of
achieving that purpose is suggested in the first tentative draft of the Commercial
Code's provisions dealing with Inventory Financ'ng: to penalize indifference to
the assignor's accounting for proceeds by taking away only the proceeds themselves,
rather than all of the assets subject to the lien.
Several states go farther than this and excuse "any act or thing done or omitted
to be done" by the assignor, so far as the validity of the assignment as against third
parties is concerned. However, Ohio may have botched this effort by failing to
state expressly, as Washington and North and South Carolina have done, that the
assignee's consent to or acquiescence in the assignor's conduct will not affect the

assignment's validity. Perhaps Ohio intended to distinguish the assignee's consent
or acquiescence from mere unwitting indulgence, but either way Ohio's statute is,
on this point, less than clear.
Of course, the lender on receivables is usually as vitally interested in the proceeds as he is in the accounts assigned, and his assignment will itself as a rule
expressly cover proceeds in the form of cash, commercial paper, and returned goods.
Many notice-filing statutes have undertaken to define the lender's rights in proceeds
for him, lest he be less than usually careful in defining them himself (or lest conflicting interests of third parties deprive him of rights he reserved). Many of them
make his assignor a "trustee" or "agent" for him in receiving proceeds in any form,
and some of them extend the trust to cover the proceeds in the hands of any trans-

feree of or successor in interest to the assignor. In so doing they seem unnecessarily
to supply ammunition for the opponents of notice-filing legislation. Of course,
statutes which follow the American Bankers Association draft in excepting from
the rights of the assignee persons who "have acquired . . . tide [to proceeds]"in
good faith and for value" are beyond objection. But an outsider might hesitate to
have dealings with a firm known to be assigning receivables in Utah or Oklahoma,
where no such exception for bona fide purchasers of proceeds (including returned
goods) is expressed. 52 And Ohio's protection to bona fide purchasers extends only

to those who purchase, or take mortgages of, returned goods; I suppose, however,
it would be a violent misapplication of rules of construction to interpret that statute

as repealing Ohio's Negotiable Instruments Law. Of course, it may be too much
to expect in these statutes, which are primarily concerned only with notice filing,
the careful draftsmanship that has gone into the corresponding provisions of the
first Tentative Draft of the Commercial Code; but the legitimate objections of
those who fear the consequences of informing a borrower's customers of his re"' OK{LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,

§636(3)

(Supp. 1948); UTAH CODE ANN. §§8x-B-o-

4

(2) (Supp. 1947).
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ceivables fianancing might have been mitigated by leaving the matter of rights in
proceeds to the provisions of the assignment, as limited by common law.
Perhaps even more objectionable, in view of the borrower's fear of losing customers, are some of the defective provisions governing the rights of account debtors.
Here again, the common law of any state could probably have been relied on to
give adequate protection in the absence of statutory provision. However, a desire
to insure that the constructive-notice effect of notice filing would not be extended
in any way against account debtors led most of the states to include provisions
designed to negative any such effect. Typically, California's statute does what its
common law would probably have done in the absence of a notice-filing statute:
it provides that

A debtor, irrespective of the provisions of [the notice-filing section], until notified by
his creditor or the assignee not to do so, may pay or otherwise deal in good faith with
the assignor, his agent for collection or any person who has succeeded to the assignor's
interest, and shall have as against the assignee any right of set-off, counterclaim or defense against such assignor or person existing in his favor at the time he is so notified.53
The American Bankers Association draft, adopted in this respect in Florida and
Colorado, goes farther and requires that notice to the account debtor be in writing
before it may affect his rights. Only the drafters of the Commercial Code thought
4
it was necessary to give the account debtor further protection.5
These provisions, some of which go even farther than the common law, eliminate
a substantial portion of the grounds upon which it could be assumed that customers
would leave a firm known to be assigning its accounts. But six states feed this
argument against notice filing by making express but inadequate provision governing the rights of account debtors. Missouri, North and South Carolina, and Texas
simply fail to mention the debtor's set-offs and defenses, except the defense of goodfaith payment to or adjustment with the assignor or his successor in interest. Perhaps interpretation will supply the defect in those states. Idaho is more explicit;
although granting the other usual protections, it expressly denies the account debtor
"any right of set-off, counterclaim or recoupment against any claim of the protected
assignee because of any claim of any nature which the debtor shall have acquired
"CAL. CIV. CODE §3018 (Supp. 1945).

54The Commercial Code, Art. VII, Part III (Tentative Draft No. i) §2t(2) provides that the right
of a financer holding a lien "on the proceeds of a contract made by the borrower is subject to . . . (c)
any adjustment made in good faith between the borrower and obligor with respect to any claimed breach
of the contract by the borrower even though the obligor prior to the adjustment had knowledge of the
financer's interest." In view of the deep concern on the part of the opponents of notice-filing legislation with the fact that knowledge of an assignment of receivables might cause an assignor's customers
to take their business elsewhere, it is suprising to find this provision, which is designed to relieve one of
those causes, criticized by one of the leading opponents. Perhaps it is possible to go too far in this
direction, although one would expect spokesmen for the small-businessman-borrower to desire every
assurance to the assignor's customers that the assignment would leave them in exactly the same position
they would have enjoyed but for it. The criticism to which I refer, that of Mr. Kupfer in a Memorandum on Tentative Draft No. i of Part III of Article VII of the Commercial Code, published by him
in mimeographed form, indicates a belief that this provision does go too far, and would encourage
"collusion of a most undesirable sort."
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after the protected assignee shall have received 55 his assignment," except that a
claim for damages occurring after the assignment but arising out of a "guarantee
or warranty expressed or implied made prior thereto" may be set off." Utah
similarly denies such rights of set-off and does so without the Idaho exception.
One wonders who had the ear of the Idaho and Utah legislators, the proponents
or the opponents of notice-filing legislation.
CONCLUSION

My own study of this controvery has left me convinced that the arguments
directed against the defects of draftsmanship in existing notice-filing statutes are
the most substantial of the arguments made by the opponents of such legislation;
in fact, I have been appalled to find how substantial they really are. But the law
teacher's dictum that such defects can be avoided by careful work 57 is beautifully
demonstrated by the fact that the first Tentative Draft of the Inventory Financing
part of the Commercial Code meets substantially all of the specific criticisms that
have been outlined in the preceding pages. Its "inventory lien," which covers both
tangibles and accounts receivable, is protected by notice-filing provisions which
accord first-to-file priority, but with adequate provisions for unseating a monopolistic first-filing financer.55 However, it requires that the filing be done within one
month after the advance of new value which its lien is intended to secure, if it has
not been done before. It provides for central filing-of course, in avoiding the objections to local filing it could scarcely avoid also those made against central filingand makes the location of the "head office" of the borrovwrer determinative of the
state in which the notice should be filed.5 9 It abolishes Benedict v. Ratner, but
limits rights in proceeds in accordance with the defined diligence of the financer
in taking them after they arise. It adequately provides for the rights of innocent
third parties in proceeds, while otherwise leaving the rights of the financer in proceeds to the arrangement made by the parties. It fully protects the account debtor
from being adversely affected by the interest of the financer. None of this is meant
to suggest that the drafters of the Inventory Lien part of Article VII of the Commercial Code have already done their job; they are no doubt acutely conscious of
* "Shall have received his assignment," not "shall have protected" itl
IDAHo LAWs ANN. 1945, C. 172, §6.
"'Ihave in mind Prof. W. Barton Leach's "Anything can be done ...
[pause]

...

within reason."

" But the Code provisions have been subjected to a new "monopoly" argument to the effect that
their provision for sweeping almost all of a firm's current assets under a single floating charge, protected by a single notice on file, will tend to enable the first-filing financer to exclude others from
lending on the security of particular assets which he is unwilling to accept. In particular, the objection
goes to the inclusion of receivables under the floating charge. An outsider who was willing to lend on
receivables when the first-filing financer was not, would have difficulty breaking into the first-filer's allinclusive protection short of paying off all of the outstanding obligations held by him. Kupfer, Memorandum on Tentative Draft No. s of Part III of Article VII of the Commercial Code, cited in note 52

supra.
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nless such . . . state does not provide for central filing with respect to inventory liens," in

which ease the statute would call for filing "in the office of the Secretary of State ...
mercial Code Art. VII, Part III, §si (Tent. Draft No. i).

of this state." Com-

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

the criticisms that have been made of their proposed innovations," ° and their standards of perfection are high. For instance, the basic issue of whether or not to
assimilate receivables financing (which is usually done on a basis of specific assignments of new accounts as they arise) to the proposed floating charge on inventory
generally, as the present draft has done, appears to be undergoing reconsideration.0 1
But taken as an answer to the drafting defects in existing notice-filing legislation,
the Commercial Code's provisions demonstrate that the real dispute between the
proponents and the opponents concerns other issues. These defects have merely
provided fuel to add to the flames of the basic controversy. That controversy, I
repeat, turns simply upon the relative weight to be given to the interest of the
borrower (and of the lender who seeks his business) in secrecy in this one field of
his financing, and to the interest of third parties who deal with the borrower in an
.objective source of information concerning it. It is very difficult for an outsider to
judge the relative commercial importance of those two interests. Still, it is unavoidable that one should entertain doubts as to the wisdom of predicating a piece
of long-range commercial legislation on the assumption that it will always be
dangerous for a firm to let it be known that it is engaged in a form of financing
which, to those who understand it best, is socially useful, worthy of encouragement,
and may be evidence that expert financiers are interested in the firm and are taking
careful pains to insure its future success. But one hesitates to predicate his own
conclusions on doubts as to the permanency of the much-emphasized taint that
attaches to the hocking of receivables, in the face of the argument that it is the
smaller business concerns that will be hurt by the interim adjustment to the publicizing of the present extent of receivables financing.
On the side of the other interest-the third-party interest in notoriety-it is
certainly observable that filing offices tend to collect a good deal of dust between
the visits of creditors seeking information.6 2 Credit-reporting agencies give fuller
information, give it in one place, and are more heavily relied upon. Yet the function of n6tice filing, unlike that of real estate recording, is to supply not the basic
information but a check on it. Perhaps the reporting agencies, rather than the
individual creditors, are the only logical oiies to be expected to use that check. If
they do not yet make full use of it, perhaps the spread of receivables financing into
relatively untried fields, among untried firms, carries implications respecting the
need for such use in the future.
What is hard to get away from is how a need for such a check can be felt 5n
respect to the financing of tangibles and yet be absolutely denied in the field of
receivables. Perhaps it is unnecessary to both. But if the assertions are true that
oMost of the criticisms do not concern aspects central to this controversy, except, of course, that some

of them dispute the desirability-of any publicity requirements at all for receivables financing. The Kupfcr
memorandum, cited in notes 52 and 58 supra, makes a great many more important points than those to
which I have referred.
1
" Tentative Draft No. 2 of Article VII, Part III of the Code (August 6, 1948) makes separate provision for assignments of accounts and for liens on (other) inventory.
" But see the American Bankers Association questionnaire cited in note 37 supra.
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the provision of a check here will bring lower-cost lenders into the field, perhaps
the small-businessman-borrower has an interest on both sides of this controversy.
Perhaps, however, a special notice-filing statute for receivables is not the best way
to provide the check.
Assuming that all such doubts leave the balance between the publicity of a
well-drafted notice-filing statute and the secrecy of a well-drafted validation statute
roughly equal, the biggest doubt of all centers on whether a quite new approach
could not upset that impasse. The interesting feature of Article VII, Part III, of
the Commercial Code is not that it gives publicity to receivables financing, not that
it avoids the draftsmanship pitfalls of existing notice-filing statutes, but that it
attempts to abandon the isolated treatment of chattel mortgages, conditional sales,
trust receipts, bailment leases, consignments, factors' liens, and assignments of receivables in favor of a coordinated plan for commercial financing on inventory.
If relatively few bother to search a filing office for notices of receivables financing,
might not more do so if all the information regarding security interests in a certain
firm's inventory were also to be found in that office? If borrowers hesitate to
publicize the fact that they are assigning receivables, might they be less hesitant to
acknowledge that they are engaged in "inventory" financing?- Perhaps unfettered
public access to all the information which the filing statement contains will not be
necessary to achieve the purpose of providing a check. 63 And finally, if the serious
criticisms of the existing notice-filing statutes carry a moral, it is that carefully
prepared uniform legislation designed to protect the legitimate interests both of
the immediate parties and of interested third parties is far preferable to the haphazard, pressure-group-inspired, state-by-state legislation, rammed through to meet
an urgently felt immediate need, of which this rash of notice-filing, bookmarking,
and validation statutes6 4 is only an instance.
"' For instance, a borrower's authorization, which could be made effective for a future period sufficiently long to protect creditors during the period of the credit exclusion, might be made, requisite to
learning more than whether or not he had filed any inventory financing statements, how many, and
with what financers: specifically, to learning whether the statement covered receivables.
" Those interested in them even find defects in some of the simple validation statutes. Consider, for
instance, the Connecticut provision cited in note 26 supra.

